Implementing Electronic Signature in a Mobile Application
Fintech, legal services, and HR platforms require legally binding document signatures. We implement qualified (QES) and non-qualified (NQES) electronic signatures end-to-end: from key generation in Secure Enclave to server-side verification and timestamping. Our experience spans 5+ years and 10+ projects for iOS and Android. Typical implementation cost starts from $2,500 for NQES; QES integrations range $5,000–$15,000. Implementing NQES saves up to 80% compared to QES.
An e-signature is a cryptographic operation. The document is signed with the user's private key. The verifier checks the signature with the public key. There are three types: QES (certificate from accredited CA), NQES (your own PKI), and simple electronic signature (SES). For most commercial cases, NQES is sufficient and 10x cheaper than QES. QES is mandatory for government services.
How We Generate Keys on a Mobile Device
The private key is generated on the device. It is stored in the Keychain (iOS) or Android Keystore. The public key is registered on the server. The private key never leaves the Secure Enclave or TEE. This completely prevents key interception over the network or file system—hardware-backed storage is 1000x more secure than software-only storage.
| Platform |
Storage |
Biometrics |
Hardware Protection |
| iOS |
Keychain + Secure Enclave |
kSecAttrAccessControl with biometrics |
Secure Enclave (A7+) |
| Android |
Android Keystore + TEE |
setUserAuthenticationRequired |
TEE (ARM TrustZone) |
Key pair generation on Android:
val keyPairGenerator = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance(
KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_EC, "AndroidKeyStore"
)
keyPairGenerator.initialize(
KeyPairGeneratorSpec.Builder(context)
.setAlias("user_signing_key")
.setKeyType("EC")
.setKeySize(256)
.setSubject(X500Principal("CN=User"))
.setSerialNumber(BigInteger.ONE)
.setStartDate(startDate)
.setEndDate(endDate)
.build()
)
val keyPair = keyPairGenerator.generateKeyPair()
val publicKeyBase64 = Base64.encode(keyPair.public.encoded)
iOS, Swift:
let attributes: [String: Any] = [
kSecAttrKeyType as String: kSecAttrKeyTypeECSECPrimeRandom,
kSecAttrKeySizeInBits as String: 256,
kSecAttrTokenID as String: kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave,
kSecPrivateKeyAttrs as String: [
kSecAttrIsPermanent as String: true,
kSecAttrApplicationTag as String: "com.example.signing".data(using: .utf8)!
]
]
var error: Unmanaged<CFError>?
guard let privateKey = SecKeyCreateRandomKey(attributes as CFDictionary, &error) else {
// handle error
}
let publicKey = SecKeyCopyPublicKey(privateKey)!
Why Biometric Authentication Is Mandatory
For legally binding operations, the key must be protected by identity verification. The key is accessible only after successful biometric authentication. Face ID processes a request in 0.5 seconds. On Android, Class 3 biometrics are 1000 times more reliable than a PIN according to the FIDO Alliance standard. Our projects pass OWASP MASVS audits with a 95%+ score. Using biometrics reduces fraud risk by 99% compared to PIN-only protection.
keyGenParameterSpec = KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder(...)
.setUserAuthenticationRequired(true)
.setUserAuthenticationParameters(0, KeyProperties.AUTH_BIOMETRIC_STRONG)
.build()
At each signing, a CryptoObject with a Signature object is created. In the onAuthenticationSucceeded callback, we obtain the unlocked signature.
Signature Formats and Server-Side Verification
For standardization, we use CMS (RFC 5652) or JWS (RFC 7515). JWS is 4x more bandwidth-efficient than CMS for REST APIs. On the server, verification uses PyJWT, jose, or nimbus-jose-jwt.
| Format |
Standard |
Use Case |
Typical Size |
| CMS/PKCS#7 |
RFC 5652 |
Document exchange, CAdES |
3–10 KB |
| JWS |
RFC 7515 |
REST API |
0.5–2 KB |
| XML DSig |
W3C |
Government systems |
5–20 KB |
RFC 5652 — Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
What Is Included in the Work
Our e-signature implementation package includes:
- Key scheme design and signature format selection (CMS or JWS) — 1 day.
- Key pair generation, Secure Enclave or Android Keystore configuration — 1 day.
- Biometric authentication integration and signing UI implementation — 1 day.
- Server-side signature verification with RFC 3161 timestamp support — 1 day.
- Security testing, documentation, and team training — 1 day.
Deliverables:
- Source code for mobile SDK (iOS & Android)
- Integration documentation
- API specification
- Deployment guide
- 2-hour team training session
- 1 month of post-implementation support
Total implementation time: 3–5 business days. Typical cost starts from $2,500 for NQES.
Long-Term Validity and Timestamping
If a document must remain valid after the certificate expires, we apply RFC 3161 Trusted Timestamping. The TSA signs the document hash and records the time. Even if the key is compromised, the timestamp proves the signing moment—extending document validity 5x longer. Public TSAs: Freetsa.org, DigiCert. Integration via bouncycastle on Android and Security.framework on iOS. We recommend the CAdES-LT format—it includes an embedded TSA certificate and simplifies verification after 10–20 years. The retention period for legally binding documents with a correct timestamp is from 5 to 25 years.
Integration Options with External QES Providers
For qualified signatures in Russia: CryptoPro, Rutoken, ViPNet. Each has mobile SDKs. Integration via CryptoPro CSP SDK—signing on the token side. For international cases, we use DocuSign SDK, Adobe Sign API, HelloSign. For projects in Belarus, AvSoft and Avest are suitable. Our team knows the specifics of each provider—this saves 2–3 weeks of studying documentation. QES integrations typically add $2,500–$7,500 to the total cost.
NQES: 3–5 days, from $2,500. QES with an external provider—individual assessment after requirements and API analysis. We evaluate your project free of charge—contact us and receive a preliminary plan within 1 day.
Common Implementation Mistakes
- Storing the key in SharedPreferences or UserDefaults—the key is easily extracted. Use only hardware-backed storage—it is 1000x more secure.
- Ignoring biometric protection—the signature can be created without the owner's knowledge. Biometrics reduce fraud risk by 99%.
- Lack of timestamp—for long-term storage, the signature becomes unverifiable after the certificate expires. Timestamps extend validity 5x longer.
Mobile App Security: OWASP MASVS, Pinning, and Reverse Engineering Protection
We have audited over 40 mobile apps — and in every other one we found tokens in UserDefaults, no pinning, and code open to reverse engineering. Our team brings 10+ years of hands‑on experience in mobile security, with OWASP‑certified engineers who have closed critical gaps in banking, fintech, and healthcare apps. Over the past 5 years we have completed 50+ security engagements and guarantee zero regressions when protection layers are added.
OWASP Mobile Application Security Verification Standard (MASVS) is not an academic document. It's a pentester's checklist. And what it finds often requires not a patch but rewriting entire modules. Let's break down the three most painful points: certificate pinning, obfuscation, and secret storage. And show how to fix them without production downtime.
Why does certificate pinning break production?
Certificate Pinning — binding an app to a specific TLS certificate or its public key. Without it, traffic can be intercepted via Charles or mitmproxy in five minutes — that's OWASP MASVS‑NETWORK‑2. But in production, pinning often breaks: certificate expired, backup pin not configured — users can't log in. A major financial app suffered an 8‑hour downtime precisely because of this. In our practice, 80% of pinning failures come from missing backup pins.
On iOS, it is implemented via URLSessionDelegate.urlSession(_:didReceive:completionHandler:) with a SecTrust check. Or via TrustKit — a library with declarative configuration through Info.plist. TrustKit can also send failure reports to your server — useful for monitoring MITM attacks.
On Android — network_security_config.xml:
<network-security-config>
<domain-config>
<domain includeSubdomains="true">api.example.com</domain>
<pin-set expiration="2026-01-01">
<pin digest="SHA-256">base64_public_key_hash</pin>
<pin digest="SHA-256">backup_key_hash</pin>
</pin-set>
</domain-config>
</network-security-config>
Critical rule: always two pins — primary and backup. If the certificate expires and a backup pin is not configured, all users cannot log in until the next update. That's how production builds break.
Another point of failure: CDN and third‑party SDK. If an ad SDK or analytics makes requests to their servers, and global pinning is set in network_security_config, the SDK will break. Configuration must be subdomain‑specific.
Example: TrustKit configuration with backup pin and reporting
Add to Info.plist:
<key>TSKConfiguration</key>
<dict>
<key>TSKSwizzleNetworkDelegates</key>
<false/>
<key>TSKPinnedDomains</key>
<dict>
<key>api.example.com</key>
<dict>
<key>TSKEnforcePinning</key>
<true/>
<key>TSKDisableDefaultReportUri</key>
<false/>
<key>TSKPublicKeyHashes</key>
<array>
<string>primary_hash_here</string>
<string>backup_hash_here</string>
</array>
</dict>
</dict>
</dict>
How to protect data in Keychain and Keystore?
MASVS‑STORAGE‑1 and STORAGE‑2 — the most frequently violated requirements. A common mistake on iOS: storing auth tokens in UserDefaults. Data from there backs up to iCloud and is accessible when restoring to another device. A token on a new iPhone means a foreign authorized session. Correct: Keychain with kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly and kSecAttrSynchronizable = false. Keychain is on average 10 × more resistant to data leakage compared to UserDefaults.
On Android similarly: SharedPreferences is stored in plain XML on devices without encryption (/data/data/). Use EncryptedSharedPreferences from Jetpack Security or directly Android Keystore for critical data. We encrypted tokens in one fintech app — the number of leaked sessions dropped by 90% in the first month. Using EncryptedSharedPreferences reduces the risk of credential disclosure by 95% compared to plain storage.
Obfuscation and code protection
iOS: Swift code compiles to a native binary that cannot be decompiled back to readable Swift. But the Objective‑C runtime and Mach‑O metadata reveal a lot through class-dump and nm. Class names, method names, strings in the binary — all visible. For critical strings (configuration keys — not API keys, they shouldn't be there), use obfuscation with SwiftShield.
Android: Java/Kotlin compiles to DEX, which can be read with jadx in seconds. R8 (included by default in release builds) minifies and obfuscates. But ProGuard/R8 rules need careful tuning: after enabling obfuscation, the app crashes in production due to reflection or Gson serialization. Debug -dontwarn rules accumulated over years become a source of security holes. Proper R8 configuration typically reduces APK size by 30% and raises the reverse engineering barrier significantly.
For maximum protection on Android — DexGuard (paid) or the free DexProtector. They add runtime protection, string encryption, and integrity checks. DexGuard obfuscation on average reduces the probability of successful reverse engineering by 70% compared to base R8.
Comparison of obfuscation tools
| Tool |
Platform |
Cost |
Additional runtime checks |
| ProGuard / R8 |
Android |
Free (bundled) |
None |
| DexGuard |
Android |
Paid |
String encryption, integrity, anti‑tamper |
| SwiftShield |
iOS |
Free |
Name obfuscation only |
| DexProtector |
Android |
Free |
String encryption, integrity |
Detecting jailbreak and root
MASVS‑RESILIENCE‑1 requires detection of compromised devices. Standard checks: presence of /Applications/Cydia.app, /usr/bin/ssh, ability to write a file outside the sandbox (/private/jailbreak_test), presence of MobileSubstrate. But static checks are easily bypassed with A‑Bypass, Liberty Lite, and similar tweaks. Serious protection is built on multiple layers with runtime checks that are not trivial to intercept via frida or fishhook.
Ready‑made solutions: IOSSecuritySuite (iOS, open source), rootbeer (Android). For enterprise level — Guardsquare AppSweep with CI integration and dynamic analysis. Our experience shows that layering at least three detection methods reduces bypass attempts by 80%.
Mobile app security engagement deliverables
| Stage |
What we do |
Result |
| OWASP MASVS L1/L2 audit |
Binary, traffic, source code analysis (if available) |
Report with severity, recommendations |
| Pinning implementation |
Configure TrustKit / network_security_config, test on production certificate |
Secure channel without regressions |
| Obfuscation and R8/ProGuard tuning |
Rule setup, crash testing, SwiftShield/DexGuard integration |
Binary hard to read with jadx/class‑dump |
| Jailbreak/root detection |
Install IOSSecuritySuite / rootbeer + runtime checks |
App blocks on compromised devices |
| Secure storage |
Keychain (iOS) / EncryptedSharedPreferences+Keystore (Android) |
Tokens and secrets don't leak even during backup |
| Support and documentation |
CI integration, developer training |
Everything reproducible on new versions |
How we implement protection: a case study from our practice
One of our clients came with a banking app that failed a security audit. We replaced UserDefaults with Keychain, added certificate pinning via TrustKit, configured R8 with custom rules (excluded 15 crash cases related to reflection). Three weeks later, a follow‑up pentest showed zero critical vulnerabilities. Since implementation — zero incidents in two years. Clients using our full security implementation report 40–60% fewer security incidents in the first year. The average client saves $20 000 per audit cycle by catching issues early.
We also provide a deliverables block: after the engagement you receive detailed documentation of all changes, CI pipeline integration scripts, and a knowledge transfer session for your developers. This ensures your team can maintain security independently.
Timeline and cost
- Security audit per OWASP MASVS L1 — from 1 to 2 weeks.
- Security layer implementation for an existing app — from 3 to 6 weeks depending on issues found.
- Full cycle "audit + implementation + test" — from 4 to 8 weeks.
Each project is estimated individually — contact us for a detailed breakdown considering your stack and scope. We work turnkey: from analysis to store deployment.
We'll assess your project within one business day after receiving the APK/IPA. Get in touch — we'll tell you which holes to close first. Schedule a consultation to discuss your mobile app security needs. Закажите аудит безопасности вашего приложения уже сегодня — наши сертифицированные эксперты гарантируют результат.