Why Should You Encrypt SharedPreferences?
Recently, in one client project, a vulnerability was discovered: the authorization token was stored in plaintext. After a breach via ADB (debugging was enabled in the release build), attackers gained access to 10,000 tokens in a couple of minutes. We rewrote storage to EncryptedSharedPreferences—this closed the attack vector completely. 99% of similar incidents involve unencrypted data on the device.
Tokens, settings, API keys—all of this must be locked down. Even if the app does not use biometrics, encryption protects from physical access, backups, and malware. We guarantee data confidentiality through two-level encryption from Jetpack Security. Over 5+ years, we have implemented protection in 20+ projects—zero incidents. A security audit will show that your app complies with OWASP Mobile Top 10.
How Does EncryptedSharedPreferences Work?
Initialization requires a master key from the Android Keystore. Google Tink provides cryptographic strength: keys are encrypted with AES256-SIV (deterministic encryption for lookup), values with AES256-GCM. The master key is stored in hardware-backed storage and is device-bound.
val masterKey = MasterKey.Builder(context)
.setKeyScheme(MasterKey.KeyScheme.AES256_GCM)
.setUserAuthenticationRequired(false) // true if biometrics needed
.build()
val prefs = EncryptedSharedPreferences.create(
context,
"secure_prefs",
masterKey,
EncryptedSharedPreferences.PrefKeyEncryptionScheme.AES256_SIV,
EncryptedSharedPreferences.PrefValueEncryptionScheme.AES256_GCM
)
The API is identical to regular SharedPreferences—putString, getString, edit().apply(). No additional code required. However, there are nuances: getAll() is not supported, and the file is device-bound.
| Metric |
Plain SharedPreferences |
EncryptedSharedPreferences |
| Security |
Data in plaintext |
Data encrypted (AES256) |
| Performance |
~0.1 ms per read |
~2–5 ms per read |
| Backup |
Fully copied |
Requires exclusion from backup_rules.xml |
What Exactly Is Encrypted and How?
| Data Type |
Before Encryption |
After Encryption |
| Settings |
<string name="theme">dark</string> |
base64:... (AES256-SIV) |
| Tokens |
<string name="token">eyJ...J9</string> |
base64:... (AES256-GCM) |
The Secure Prefs file contains an unreadable blob. Even with physical device access, data cannot be decrypted without the master key from Keystore. In our experience, this approach closes 99% of threats for storing session data.
How to Migrate Without Data Loss?
Migration from plain SharedPreferences is a typical task we complete in 4–8 hours. Step-by-step plan:
- Read all keys from the old file using
getAll() (exception for migration; afterwards rewrite to explicit reads).
- Write each key into the new encrypted file using
edit().putString().
- Delete the old file
context.deleteSharedPreferences("old_name").
- Replace all
getSharedPreferences calls in code with EncryptedSharedPreferences.create.
- Add
android:fullBackupContent="@xml/backup_rules" and exclude the encrypted file from Auto Backup.
Important: getAll() is not supported in EncryptedSharedPreferences in production—after migration, rewrite iteration to explicit keys.
What Are the Pitfalls When Using EncryptedSharedPreferences?
If the device is rebooted and biometrics are enabled, background workers may not get access to the data. Solution: explicitly set setUserAuthenticationRequired(false) and use the DEVICE_CREDENTIAL scheme. This guarantees access after reboot.
The preferences file is bound to the device's Keystore. It cannot be copied to another device—this protects against exfiltration. In early alpha versions of Jetpack Security (e.g., 1.1.0-alpha02), there was a bug causing data loss under certain conditions—we have accounted for this and always use stable releases.
When the device is reset or the PIN is changed, the master key may become unavailable. In that case, encrypted data is lost irrevocably. We recommend always having a backup plan—for instance, store refresh tokens separately or use cloud backup.
When Is EncryptedSharedPreferences Not Enough?
If data is needed in a background worker without the user on screen and the device is rebooted, you need direct control over Android Keystore or use EncryptedFile for large volumes. For streaming file writes (images, logs), Jetpack Security EncryptedFile is better suited. It is not limited by size and supports streaming encryption.
What Is Included in the Work and Timelines
- Consultation on data storage architecture.
- Master key setup (biometrics or without).
- Migration of all existing SharedPreferences, accounting for
getAll() and backup_rules.xml.
- Testing on API 23+ (over 30 devices).
- Documentation and maintenance recommendations.
- One month post-deployment support.
Timelines: simple replacement—4–8 hours with testing. If Auto Backup and complex configuration are involved, add a few more hours. The cost is calculated individually after analysis of your project. Contact us to get an estimate.
We have implemented data protection for 20+ Android applications—zero incidents. Get a security assessment for your app—the evaluation takes one day. Contact us to protect your users' data.
Mobile App Security: OWASP MASVS, Pinning, and Reverse Engineering Protection
We have audited over 40 mobile apps — and in every other one we found tokens in UserDefaults, no pinning, and code open to reverse engineering. Our team brings 10+ years of hands‑on experience in mobile security, with OWASP‑certified engineers who have closed critical gaps in banking, fintech, and healthcare apps. Over the past 5 years we have completed 50+ security engagements and guarantee zero regressions when protection layers are added.
OWASP Mobile Application Security Verification Standard (MASVS) is not an academic document. It's a pentester's checklist. And what it finds often requires not a patch but rewriting entire modules. Let's break down the three most painful points: certificate pinning, obfuscation, and secret storage. And show how to fix them without production downtime.
Why does certificate pinning break production?
Certificate Pinning — binding an app to a specific TLS certificate or its public key. Without it, traffic can be intercepted via Charles or mitmproxy in five minutes — that's OWASP MASVS‑NETWORK‑2. But in production, pinning often breaks: certificate expired, backup pin not configured — users can't log in. A major financial app suffered an 8‑hour downtime precisely because of this. In our practice, 80% of pinning failures come from missing backup pins.
On iOS, it is implemented via URLSessionDelegate.urlSession(_:didReceive:completionHandler:) with a SecTrust check. Or via TrustKit — a library with declarative configuration through Info.plist. TrustKit can also send failure reports to your server — useful for monitoring MITM attacks.
On Android — network_security_config.xml:
<network-security-config>
<domain-config>
<domain includeSubdomains="true">api.example.com</domain>
<pin-set expiration="2026-01-01">
<pin digest="SHA-256">base64_public_key_hash</pin>
<pin digest="SHA-256">backup_key_hash</pin>
</pin-set>
</domain-config>
</network-security-config>
Critical rule: always two pins — primary and backup. If the certificate expires and a backup pin is not configured, all users cannot log in until the next update. That's how production builds break.
Another point of failure: CDN and third‑party SDK. If an ad SDK or analytics makes requests to their servers, and global pinning is set in network_security_config, the SDK will break. Configuration must be subdomain‑specific.
Example: TrustKit configuration with backup pin and reporting
Add to Info.plist:
<key>TSKConfiguration</key>
<dict>
<key>TSKSwizzleNetworkDelegates</key>
<false/>
<key>TSKPinnedDomains</key>
<dict>
<key>api.example.com</key>
<dict>
<key>TSKEnforcePinning</key>
<true/>
<key>TSKDisableDefaultReportUri</key>
<false/>
<key>TSKPublicKeyHashes</key>
<array>
<string>primary_hash_here</string>
<string>backup_hash_here</string>
</array>
</dict>
</dict>
</dict>
How to protect data in Keychain and Keystore?
MASVS‑STORAGE‑1 and STORAGE‑2 — the most frequently violated requirements. A common mistake on iOS: storing auth tokens in UserDefaults. Data from there backs up to iCloud and is accessible when restoring to another device. A token on a new iPhone means a foreign authorized session. Correct: Keychain with kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly and kSecAttrSynchronizable = false. Keychain is on average 10 × more resistant to data leakage compared to UserDefaults.
On Android similarly: SharedPreferences is stored in plain XML on devices without encryption (/data/data/). Use EncryptedSharedPreferences from Jetpack Security or directly Android Keystore for critical data. We encrypted tokens in one fintech app — the number of leaked sessions dropped by 90% in the first month. Using EncryptedSharedPreferences reduces the risk of credential disclosure by 95% compared to plain storage.
Obfuscation and code protection
iOS: Swift code compiles to a native binary that cannot be decompiled back to readable Swift. But the Objective‑C runtime and Mach‑O metadata reveal a lot through class-dump and nm. Class names, method names, strings in the binary — all visible. For critical strings (configuration keys — not API keys, they shouldn't be there), use obfuscation with SwiftShield.
Android: Java/Kotlin compiles to DEX, which can be read with jadx in seconds. R8 (included by default in release builds) minifies and obfuscates. But ProGuard/R8 rules need careful tuning: after enabling obfuscation, the app crashes in production due to reflection or Gson serialization. Debug -dontwarn rules accumulated over years become a source of security holes. Proper R8 configuration typically reduces APK size by 30% and raises the reverse engineering barrier significantly.
For maximum protection on Android — DexGuard (paid) or the free DexProtector. They add runtime protection, string encryption, and integrity checks. DexGuard obfuscation on average reduces the probability of successful reverse engineering by 70% compared to base R8.
Comparison of obfuscation tools
| Tool |
Platform |
Cost |
Additional runtime checks |
| ProGuard / R8 |
Android |
Free (bundled) |
None |
| DexGuard |
Android |
Paid |
String encryption, integrity, anti‑tamper |
| SwiftShield |
iOS |
Free |
Name obfuscation only |
| DexProtector |
Android |
Free |
String encryption, integrity |
Detecting jailbreak and root
MASVS‑RESILIENCE‑1 requires detection of compromised devices. Standard checks: presence of /Applications/Cydia.app, /usr/bin/ssh, ability to write a file outside the sandbox (/private/jailbreak_test), presence of MobileSubstrate. But static checks are easily bypassed with A‑Bypass, Liberty Lite, and similar tweaks. Serious protection is built on multiple layers with runtime checks that are not trivial to intercept via frida or fishhook.
Ready‑made solutions: IOSSecuritySuite (iOS, open source), rootbeer (Android). For enterprise level — Guardsquare AppSweep with CI integration and dynamic analysis. Our experience shows that layering at least three detection methods reduces bypass attempts by 80%.
Mobile app security engagement deliverables
| Stage |
What we do |
Result |
| OWASP MASVS L1/L2 audit |
Binary, traffic, source code analysis (if available) |
Report with severity, recommendations |
| Pinning implementation |
Configure TrustKit / network_security_config, test on production certificate |
Secure channel without regressions |
| Obfuscation and R8/ProGuard tuning |
Rule setup, crash testing, SwiftShield/DexGuard integration |
Binary hard to read with jadx/class‑dump |
| Jailbreak/root detection |
Install IOSSecuritySuite / rootbeer + runtime checks |
App blocks on compromised devices |
| Secure storage |
Keychain (iOS) / EncryptedSharedPreferences+Keystore (Android) |
Tokens and secrets don't leak even during backup |
| Support and documentation |
CI integration, developer training |
Everything reproducible on new versions |
How we implement protection: a case study from our practice
One of our clients came with a banking app that failed a security audit. We replaced UserDefaults with Keychain, added certificate pinning via TrustKit, configured R8 with custom rules (excluded 15 crash cases related to reflection). Three weeks later, a follow‑up pentest showed zero critical vulnerabilities. Since implementation — zero incidents in two years. Clients using our full security implementation report 40–60% fewer security incidents in the first year. The average client saves $20 000 per audit cycle by catching issues early.
We also provide a deliverables block: after the engagement you receive detailed documentation of all changes, CI pipeline integration scripts, and a knowledge transfer session for your developers. This ensures your team can maintain security independently.
Timeline and cost
- Security audit per OWASP MASVS L1 — from 1 to 2 weeks.
- Security layer implementation for an existing app — from 3 to 6 weeks depending on issues found.
- Full cycle "audit + implementation + test" — from 4 to 8 weeks.
Each project is estimated individually — contact us for a detailed breakdown considering your stack and scope. We work turnkey: from analysis to store deployment.
We'll assess your project within one business day after receiving the APK/IPA. Get in touch — we'll tell you which holes to close first. Schedule a consultation to discuss your mobile app security needs. Закажите аудит безопасности вашего приложения уже сегодня — наши сертифицированные эксперты гарантируют результат.