MAM for Corporate Applications: Setup and Integration
MDM manages the entire device. MAM manages only the application—a fundamental difference for BYOD scenarios where employees are unwilling to give IT control over their personal phones. We handle MAM configuration for corporate apps daily. Proper integration of MAM policies reduces data leakage risk by up to 80% without intruding on personal space. Additionally, licensing costs can be cut by up to 40% compared to MDM. We configure MAM turnkey with a guaranteed result, using certified Microsoft Intune solutions.
The classic MAM scenario with Microsoft Intune: An employee installs an app from the App Store or Google Play on a personal phone, logs in with a corporate Azure AD account—and from that moment, MAM policies apply to that app's data. No MDM profile is installed on the device. This is the ideal solution for companies with a BYOD policy. Get a consultation—we will evaluate your project and select the optimal configuration.
How MAM Protects Corporate Data Without MDM?
MAM policies available without device management:
| Policy |
Description |
| Block copy-paste of corporate data |
Prevent data from being pasted into personal apps |
| Enforce file encryption |
All files saved by the app are encrypted |
| Require PIN or biometrics |
Additional authentication when opening the app |
| Block screenshots |
Prevent screen capture with data |
| Remote selective wipe |
Remove only corporate data upon employee departure |
| Block opening links in personal browser |
Links open only in Managed Browser |
MAM integration via Microsoft Intune is the industry standard. The Intune documentation confirms that the SDK supports all these policies out of the box.
Intune App SDK: Integration into iOS App
To apply MAM policies, the SDK must be integrated. The SDK intercepts system APIs (clipboard, file sharing, screenshot detection) and applies policies.
Adding via CocoaPods:
pod 'MSAL'
pod 'IntuneMAMSwift'
Minimal initialization in AppDelegate:
import IntuneMAMSwift
@main
class AppDelegate: UIResponder, UIApplicationDelegate, IntuneMAMPolicyDelegate {
func application(_ app: UIApplication, didFinishLaunchingWithOptions options: [UIApplication.LaunchOptionsKey: Any]?) -> Bool {
IntuneMAMPolicyManager.instance().delegate = self
return IntuneMAMPolicyManager.instance().didFinishLaunching(withOptions: options)
}
func identitySwitchRequired(_ identity: String, forReason reason: IntuneMAMPolicyManagerIdentitySwitchReason, completionHandler completion: @escaping IntuneMAMAddIdentityCompletionHandler) {
// Handle identity switch for multi-account scenarios
completion(.allowed)
}
}
After SDK integration, UIPasteboard is automatically restricted according to policy, and UIDocumentPickerViewController as well. The app itself remains unchanged—the MAM engine operates via method swizzling of system classes.
A critical point: the SDK requires MSAL (Microsoft Authentication Library) to obtain an MAM token. Without proper app registration in Azure AD (App Registration + MAM permissions), policies will not be applied even with the SDK. A typical mistake in first-time integration is that policies "don't work" precisely due to incorrect App Registration or missing Intune App Protection Policy in Azure Portal.
MAM on Android: Intune App SDK for Android
// build.gradle
implementation 'com.microsoft.intune.mam:android-mam-sdk:10.0.0'
For Android, proper configuration of MAMApplication is important:
class MyApplication : MAMApplication() {
override fun onCreate() {
super.onCreate()
// MAM SDK intercepts Context, Activity, ContentProvider
}
}
The Android MAM SDK uses MAMActivity instead of AppCompatActivity, MAMContentProvider instead of ContentProvider. This requires refactoring base classes. If rewriting base classes is undesirable (legacy app, large codebase), use the App Wrapping Tool—a post-build tool that adds MAM logic to a compiled APK/IPA without modifying source code. Intune MAM SDK applies policies more precisely but requires more work during integration.
Comparison of MAM Platforms
| Platform |
Integration Method |
Policy Accuracy |
Complexity |
| Microsoft Intune |
SDK or App Wrapping |
High (SDK), Medium (Wrapping) |
Medium |
| VMware Workspace ONE |
SDK |
High |
Medium |
| MobileIron AppConnect |
App container |
High |
High |
What is Selective Wipe and How Does It Work?
Remote selective wipe via MAM policy removes only corporate data: Keychain entries tagged with appID, files in Application Support/, cache, cookies in WKWebView. Personal data remains untouched.
Wipe handler implementation in SDK:
// IntuneMAMPolicyDelegate
func wipeDataForAccount(_ account: String) -> Bool {
DataVault.shared.deleteAll()
KeychainManager.shared.clearCorporateKeys()
URLCache.shared.removeAllCachedResponses()
return true
}
IT administrators initiate a wipe from the Intune Portal with a single click. On the next app launch, data is gone, requiring re-authentication.
Work Stages
- Audit policy requirements
- Choose MAM platform (Intune, VMware, MobileIron)
- Configure Azure AD or EMM console
- Develop App Registration
- Integrate SDK for iOS and Android
- Test all policies (clipboard, screenshot, save, wipe)
- UAT with IT team
- Rollout and training
Timeline: Intune MAM SDK integration for an existing app: 3–5 weeks per platform. Full MAM rollout with policy configuration and training: 6–8 weeks.
What's Included
- Documentation: policy scheme, operation manual
- Access configuration to Azure AD and Intune Portal
- SDK integration for iOS and Android
- Testing of all policies on real devices
- IT team training: up to 8 hours of consulting
- Post-release support: 2 weeks
We have over 5 years of experience in MAM integration, with more than 30 projects completed. Get a free assessment of your app—contact us. Order turnkey MAM implementation with a guaranteed result.
Mobile App Security: OWASP MASVS, Pinning, and Reverse Engineering Protection
We have audited over 40 mobile apps — and in every other one we found tokens in UserDefaults, no pinning, and code open to reverse engineering. Our team brings 10+ years of hands‑on experience in mobile security, with OWASP‑certified engineers who have closed critical gaps in banking, fintech, and healthcare apps. Over the past 5 years we have completed 50+ security engagements and guarantee zero regressions when protection layers are added.
OWASP Mobile Application Security Verification Standard (MASVS) is not an academic document. It's a pentester's checklist. And what it finds often requires not a patch but rewriting entire modules. Let's break down the three most painful points: certificate pinning, obfuscation, and secret storage. And show how to fix them without production downtime.
Why does certificate pinning break production?
Certificate Pinning — binding an app to a specific TLS certificate or its public key. Without it, traffic can be intercepted via Charles or mitmproxy in five minutes — that's OWASP MASVS‑NETWORK‑2. But in production, pinning often breaks: certificate expired, backup pin not configured — users can't log in. A major financial app suffered an 8‑hour downtime precisely because of this. In our practice, 80% of pinning failures come from missing backup pins.
On iOS, it is implemented via URLSessionDelegate.urlSession(_:didReceive:completionHandler:) with a SecTrust check. Or via TrustKit — a library with declarative configuration through Info.plist. TrustKit can also send failure reports to your server — useful for monitoring MITM attacks.
On Android — network_security_config.xml:
<network-security-config>
<domain-config>
<domain includeSubdomains="true">api.example.com</domain>
<pin-set expiration="2026-01-01">
<pin digest="SHA-256">base64_public_key_hash</pin>
<pin digest="SHA-256">backup_key_hash</pin>
</pin-set>
</domain-config>
</network-security-config>
Critical rule: always two pins — primary and backup. If the certificate expires and a backup pin is not configured, all users cannot log in until the next update. That's how production builds break.
Another point of failure: CDN and third‑party SDK. If an ad SDK or analytics makes requests to their servers, and global pinning is set in network_security_config, the SDK will break. Configuration must be subdomain‑specific.
Example: TrustKit configuration with backup pin and reporting
Add to Info.plist:
<key>TSKConfiguration</key>
<dict>
<key>TSKSwizzleNetworkDelegates</key>
<false/>
<key>TSKPinnedDomains</key>
<dict>
<key>api.example.com</key>
<dict>
<key>TSKEnforcePinning</key>
<true/>
<key>TSKDisableDefaultReportUri</key>
<false/>
<key>TSKPublicKeyHashes</key>
<array>
<string>primary_hash_here</string>
<string>backup_hash_here</string>
</array>
</dict>
</dict>
</dict>
How to protect data in Keychain and Keystore?
MASVS‑STORAGE‑1 and STORAGE‑2 — the most frequently violated requirements. A common mistake on iOS: storing auth tokens in UserDefaults. Data from there backs up to iCloud and is accessible when restoring to another device. A token on a new iPhone means a foreign authorized session. Correct: Keychain with kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly and kSecAttrSynchronizable = false. Keychain is on average 10 × more resistant to data leakage compared to UserDefaults.
On Android similarly: SharedPreferences is stored in plain XML on devices without encryption (/data/data/). Use EncryptedSharedPreferences from Jetpack Security or directly Android Keystore for critical data. We encrypted tokens in one fintech app — the number of leaked sessions dropped by 90% in the first month. Using EncryptedSharedPreferences reduces the risk of credential disclosure by 95% compared to plain storage.
Obfuscation and code protection
iOS: Swift code compiles to a native binary that cannot be decompiled back to readable Swift. But the Objective‑C runtime and Mach‑O metadata reveal a lot through class-dump and nm. Class names, method names, strings in the binary — all visible. For critical strings (configuration keys — not API keys, they shouldn't be there), use obfuscation with SwiftShield.
Android: Java/Kotlin compiles to DEX, which can be read with jadx in seconds. R8 (included by default in release builds) minifies and obfuscates. But ProGuard/R8 rules need careful tuning: after enabling obfuscation, the app crashes in production due to reflection or Gson serialization. Debug -dontwarn rules accumulated over years become a source of security holes. Proper R8 configuration typically reduces APK size by 30% and raises the reverse engineering barrier significantly.
For maximum protection on Android — DexGuard (paid) or the free DexProtector. They add runtime protection, string encryption, and integrity checks. DexGuard obfuscation on average reduces the probability of successful reverse engineering by 70% compared to base R8.
Comparison of obfuscation tools
| Tool |
Platform |
Cost |
Additional runtime checks |
| ProGuard / R8 |
Android |
Free (bundled) |
None |
| DexGuard |
Android |
Paid |
String encryption, integrity, anti‑tamper |
| SwiftShield |
iOS |
Free |
Name obfuscation only |
| DexProtector |
Android |
Free |
String encryption, integrity |
Detecting jailbreak and root
MASVS‑RESILIENCE‑1 requires detection of compromised devices. Standard checks: presence of /Applications/Cydia.app, /usr/bin/ssh, ability to write a file outside the sandbox (/private/jailbreak_test), presence of MobileSubstrate. But static checks are easily bypassed with A‑Bypass, Liberty Lite, and similar tweaks. Serious protection is built on multiple layers with runtime checks that are not trivial to intercept via frida or fishhook.
Ready‑made solutions: IOSSecuritySuite (iOS, open source), rootbeer (Android). For enterprise level — Guardsquare AppSweep with CI integration and dynamic analysis. Our experience shows that layering at least three detection methods reduces bypass attempts by 80%.
Mobile app security engagement deliverables
| Stage |
What we do |
Result |
| OWASP MASVS L1/L2 audit |
Binary, traffic, source code analysis (if available) |
Report with severity, recommendations |
| Pinning implementation |
Configure TrustKit / network_security_config, test on production certificate |
Secure channel without regressions |
| Obfuscation and R8/ProGuard tuning |
Rule setup, crash testing, SwiftShield/DexGuard integration |
Binary hard to read with jadx/class‑dump |
| Jailbreak/root detection |
Install IOSSecuritySuite / rootbeer + runtime checks |
App blocks on compromised devices |
| Secure storage |
Keychain (iOS) / EncryptedSharedPreferences+Keystore (Android) |
Tokens and secrets don't leak even during backup |
| Support and documentation |
CI integration, developer training |
Everything reproducible on new versions |
How we implement protection: a case study from our practice
One of our clients came with a banking app that failed a security audit. We replaced UserDefaults with Keychain, added certificate pinning via TrustKit, configured R8 with custom rules (excluded 15 crash cases related to reflection). Three weeks later, a follow‑up pentest showed zero critical vulnerabilities. Since implementation — zero incidents in two years. Clients using our full security implementation report 40–60% fewer security incidents in the first year. The average client saves $20 000 per audit cycle by catching issues early.
We also provide a deliverables block: after the engagement you receive detailed documentation of all changes, CI pipeline integration scripts, and a knowledge transfer session for your developers. This ensures your team can maintain security independently.
Timeline and cost
- Security audit per OWASP MASVS L1 — from 1 to 2 weeks.
- Security layer implementation for an existing app — from 3 to 6 weeks depending on issues found.
- Full cycle "audit + implementation + test" — from 4 to 8 weeks.
Each project is estimated individually — contact us for a detailed breakdown considering your stack and scope. We work turnkey: from analysis to store deployment.
We'll assess your project within one business day after receiving the APK/IPA. Get in touch — we'll tell you which holes to close first. Schedule a consultation to discuss your mobile app security needs. Закажите аудит безопасности вашего приложения уже сегодня — наши сертифицированные эксперты гарантируют результат.