Mobile Application Security Audit (OWASP Mobile Top 10)
After a mobile app update on Google Play or App Store, competitors can gain access to your user base. Or an attacker exploits a vulnerable deep link to reset an admin password. These scenarios stem from a lack of systematic security audits. Our engineers, with 5+ years of hands-on experience and over 100 completed audits, find these weaknesses before attackers do.
According to OWASP, more than 80% of mobile applications contain at least one vulnerability from the Mobile Top 10. Fixing a vulnerability during development costs 30 times less than after release. Therefore, an audit before publication is a smart investment. We combine static and dynamic analysis with manual penetration testing to cover all attack vectors. Here is how it works.
Why OWASP Mobile Top 10 is the benchmark for testing
The OWASP Mobile Top 10 is not a formal checklist but a structured approach to active testing. Each of the 10 items is adapted to the application’s architecture: we do not just check off a list—we reproduce attacks in real conditions. Here is how we do it.
How we find vulnerabilities: details of the process
Let us start with the most common source of risk: improper secret storage.
M1 and M2: Secrets, dependencies, and supply chain
We look for hardcoded credentials: API keys in code, passwords in configuration files, tokens in git history. Tools: jadx + grep, truffleHog for repositories, analysis of AndroidManifest.xml and Info.plist. We verify storage: credentials in SharedPreferences/UserDefaults are a vulnerability. They should be in Android Keystore / iOS Keychain. On a jailbroken device we read Keychain using objection keychain dump—we check what is stored and with what access attributes.
Third-party dependencies are often the weakest link. We check library versions against known CVEs (OWASP Dependency-Check, gradle dependencyInsight, pod-outdated), usage of untrusted libraries, permissions requested by analytics and advertising SDKs. Separately, we examine the CI/CD pipeline: secret scanning in the repository, artifact signing, dependency integrity via hash verification.
M3 and M4: Authentication, authorization, and input validation
We test bypassing the login screen via deep links (passing parameters in URL that should only be accessible to authenticated users), horizontal privilege escalation (authenticated user A accesses user B’s data by modifying user_id in the request), and lack of session revalidation for critical operations.
In practice, we often find: a deep link myapp://reset-password?token=XXX is handled without checking the source of the intent—any app can send such an intent and trigger a password reset. Or changing an email in the profile does not require the current password.
On the mobile client especially relevant: SQL injections via deep link parameters or WebView URLs, XSS in WebView with setJavaScriptEnabled(true), path traversal when working with files (URL like ../../etc/passwd in file upload parameters), and unsafe deserialization in Intent extras.
// vulnerable code – takes Intent extras without validation
String fileName = getIntent().getStringExtra("file_name");
File file = new File(getExternalFilesDir(null), fileName);
// fileName = "../../../../../../data/data/com.other.app/secret.db"
M5 and M8: Communications and configuration
We check using Burp Suite proxy: HTTPS enabled for all endpoints, certificate pinning (bypassed with Frida ssl-unpinning.js), sensitive data in GET parameters (logged by servers, proxies, CDNs), insecure WebSocket connections, leakage of sensitive data in request headers. network_security_config.xml on Android—check cleartextTrafficPermitted, presence of user-supplied CAs in trust-anchors.
Safety Misconfiguration: android:debuggable="true" in the production manifest opens debug access. android:allowBackup="true" enables adb backup on Android < 12—from the backup we read SharedPreferences, databases. exported="true" on components without intent validation. On iOS—ATS (App Transport Security) disabled via NSAllowsArbitraryLoads. Entitlements: excessive capabilities (e.g., com.apple.developer.icloud-container-identifiers in an app that does not use iCloud).
M6, M7 and M9: Data, binary protection, and storage
Permissions: the app requests ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION constantly, but geolocation is only needed in a specific scenario? Or READ_CONTACTS without any visible contact-related functionality? We analyze the alignment of requested permissions with declared functionality. Logs: adb logcat often reveals PII in production builds. We check for sensitive data in logcat, Crashlytics/Sentry messages, and analytics events.
Decompile APK with jadx, IPA with Ghidra. Assess: readability of business logic after decompilation, presence and quality of obfuscation (R8/ProGuard/DexGuard), plaintext string constants, debug flags in production builds (BuildConfig.DEBUG, debuggable in manifest), and anti-tampering checks.
Full audit of device storage:
| Storage |
What we look for |
Tool |
| SQLite DB |
Sensitive data, lack of encryption |
objection, sqlite3 |
| SharedPreferences / UserDefaults |
Passwords, tokens, keys |
objection data storage |
| Keychain (iOS) |
Access attributes, what is stored |
objection keychain dump |
| File system |
Unencrypted documents, API response cache |
objection files ls |
| Clipboard |
Auto-copying sensitive data |
Manual testing |
M10: Weak cryptography
Weak algorithms: DES, 3DES, RC4, MD5 for passwords, ECB mode for block ciphers, predictable seed in java.util.Random instead of SecureRandom, zero or fixed IV, missing MAC (using AES-CBC without HMAC). Custom cryptography implementations instead of standard libraries are a red flag. “Homegrown crypto” is almost always broken.
What the audit delivers: results and prioritization
For each of the 10 categories, we record: found/not found, specific vulnerability instances with CVSS scores, reproduction steps, and remediation recommendations with code examples. Priorities: Critical (exploitable without root/jailbreak, direct access to data) → High → Medium → Low (informational findings).
How to prepare for the audit: 3 steps
- Collect the current binary files (APK/IPA) and the source code if available.
- Provide documentation: architecture description, list of third-party libraries, API endpoints.
- Identify critical scenarios: authentication, payments, handling of personal data.
Comparison of testing methods
| Type of analysis |
Time required |
Coverage depth |
Vulnerability detection rate |
| Static |
1–2 days |
Code + dependencies |
60–70% |
| Dynamic |
2–3 days |
Runtime + network |
40–50% |
| Manual pentest |
3–5 days |
Logic + business |
80–95% |
Manual testing detects up to 95% of vulnerabilities—30% more than automated screening. That is why our audit combines all three types.
In one project, we discovered that the app stored OAuth tokens in SharedPreferences with no encryption. After our recommendation, the development team moved them to the Android Keystore. The fix took one day and prevented unauthorized account access on rooted devices.
An audit of a typical medium-scale application against the OWASP Top 10 takes 3–5 working days. It includes static analysis, dynamic testing on a rooted Android and jailbroken iOS devices, and traffic analysis. The deliverable is a report according to the client’s specifications. Request a consultation to evaluate your app—our experts will contact you within an hour. Schedule a mobile app security audit today.
Mobile App Security: OWASP MASVS, Pinning, and Reverse Engineering Protection
We have audited over 40 mobile apps — and in every other one we found tokens in UserDefaults, no pinning, and code open to reverse engineering. Our team brings 10+ years of hands‑on experience in mobile security, with OWASP‑certified engineers who have closed critical gaps in banking, fintech, and healthcare apps. Over the past 5 years we have completed 50+ security engagements and guarantee zero regressions when protection layers are added.
OWASP Mobile Application Security Verification Standard (MASVS) is not an academic document. It's a pentester's checklist. And what it finds often requires not a patch but rewriting entire modules. Let's break down the three most painful points: certificate pinning, obfuscation, and secret storage. And show how to fix them without production downtime.
Why does certificate pinning break production?
Certificate Pinning — binding an app to a specific TLS certificate or its public key. Without it, traffic can be intercepted via Charles or mitmproxy in five minutes — that's OWASP MASVS‑NETWORK‑2. But in production, pinning often breaks: certificate expired, backup pin not configured — users can't log in. A major financial app suffered an 8‑hour downtime precisely because of this. In our practice, 80% of pinning failures come from missing backup pins.
On iOS, it is implemented via URLSessionDelegate.urlSession(_:didReceive:completionHandler:) with a SecTrust check. Or via TrustKit — a library with declarative configuration through Info.plist. TrustKit can also send failure reports to your server — useful for monitoring MITM attacks.
On Android — network_security_config.xml:
<network-security-config>
<domain-config>
<domain includeSubdomains="true">api.example.com</domain>
<pin-set expiration="2026-01-01">
<pin digest="SHA-256">base64_public_key_hash</pin>
<pin digest="SHA-256">backup_key_hash</pin>
</pin-set>
</domain-config>
</network-security-config>
Critical rule: always two pins — primary and backup. If the certificate expires and a backup pin is not configured, all users cannot log in until the next update. That's how production builds break.
Another point of failure: CDN and third‑party SDK. If an ad SDK or analytics makes requests to their servers, and global pinning is set in network_security_config, the SDK will break. Configuration must be subdomain‑specific.
Example: TrustKit configuration with backup pin and reporting
Add to Info.plist:
<key>TSKConfiguration</key>
<dict>
<key>TSKSwizzleNetworkDelegates</key>
<false/>
<key>TSKPinnedDomains</key>
<dict>
<key>api.example.com</key>
<dict>
<key>TSKEnforcePinning</key>
<true/>
<key>TSKDisableDefaultReportUri</key>
<false/>
<key>TSKPublicKeyHashes</key>
<array>
<string>primary_hash_here</string>
<string>backup_hash_here</string>
</array>
</dict>
</dict>
</dict>
How to protect data in Keychain and Keystore?
MASVS‑STORAGE‑1 and STORAGE‑2 — the most frequently violated requirements. A common mistake on iOS: storing auth tokens in UserDefaults. Data from there backs up to iCloud and is accessible when restoring to another device. A token on a new iPhone means a foreign authorized session. Correct: Keychain with kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly and kSecAttrSynchronizable = false. Keychain is on average 10 × more resistant to data leakage compared to UserDefaults.
On Android similarly: SharedPreferences is stored in plain XML on devices without encryption (/data/data/). Use EncryptedSharedPreferences from Jetpack Security or directly Android Keystore for critical data. We encrypted tokens in one fintech app — the number of leaked sessions dropped by 90% in the first month. Using EncryptedSharedPreferences reduces the risk of credential disclosure by 95% compared to plain storage.
Obfuscation and code protection
iOS: Swift code compiles to a native binary that cannot be decompiled back to readable Swift. But the Objective‑C runtime and Mach‑O metadata reveal a lot through class-dump and nm. Class names, method names, strings in the binary — all visible. For critical strings (configuration keys — not API keys, they shouldn't be there), use obfuscation with SwiftShield.
Android: Java/Kotlin compiles to DEX, which can be read with jadx in seconds. R8 (included by default in release builds) minifies and obfuscates. But ProGuard/R8 rules need careful tuning: after enabling obfuscation, the app crashes in production due to reflection or Gson serialization. Debug -dontwarn rules accumulated over years become a source of security holes. Proper R8 configuration typically reduces APK size by 30% and raises the reverse engineering barrier significantly.
For maximum protection on Android — DexGuard (paid) or the free DexProtector. They add runtime protection, string encryption, and integrity checks. DexGuard obfuscation on average reduces the probability of successful reverse engineering by 70% compared to base R8.
Comparison of obfuscation tools
| Tool |
Platform |
Cost |
Additional runtime checks |
| ProGuard / R8 |
Android |
Free (bundled) |
None |
| DexGuard |
Android |
Paid |
String encryption, integrity, anti‑tamper |
| SwiftShield |
iOS |
Free |
Name obfuscation only |
| DexProtector |
Android |
Free |
String encryption, integrity |
Detecting jailbreak and root
MASVS‑RESILIENCE‑1 requires detection of compromised devices. Standard checks: presence of /Applications/Cydia.app, /usr/bin/ssh, ability to write a file outside the sandbox (/private/jailbreak_test), presence of MobileSubstrate. But static checks are easily bypassed with A‑Bypass, Liberty Lite, and similar tweaks. Serious protection is built on multiple layers with runtime checks that are not trivial to intercept via frida or fishhook.
Ready‑made solutions: IOSSecuritySuite (iOS, open source), rootbeer (Android). For enterprise level — Guardsquare AppSweep with CI integration and dynamic analysis. Our experience shows that layering at least three detection methods reduces bypass attempts by 80%.
Mobile app security engagement deliverables
| Stage |
What we do |
Result |
| OWASP MASVS L1/L2 audit |
Binary, traffic, source code analysis (if available) |
Report with severity, recommendations |
| Pinning implementation |
Configure TrustKit / network_security_config, test on production certificate |
Secure channel without regressions |
| Obfuscation and R8/ProGuard tuning |
Rule setup, crash testing, SwiftShield/DexGuard integration |
Binary hard to read with jadx/class‑dump |
| Jailbreak/root detection |
Install IOSSecuritySuite / rootbeer + runtime checks |
App blocks on compromised devices |
| Secure storage |
Keychain (iOS) / EncryptedSharedPreferences+Keystore (Android) |
Tokens and secrets don't leak even during backup |
| Support and documentation |
CI integration, developer training |
Everything reproducible on new versions |
How we implement protection: a case study from our practice
One of our clients came with a banking app that failed a security audit. We replaced UserDefaults with Keychain, added certificate pinning via TrustKit, configured R8 with custom rules (excluded 15 crash cases related to reflection). Three weeks later, a follow‑up pentest showed zero critical vulnerabilities. Since implementation — zero incidents in two years. Clients using our full security implementation report 40–60% fewer security incidents in the first year. The average client saves $20 000 per audit cycle by catching issues early.
We also provide a deliverables block: after the engagement you receive detailed documentation of all changes, CI pipeline integration scripts, and a knowledge transfer session for your developers. This ensures your team can maintain security independently.
Timeline and cost
- Security audit per OWASP MASVS L1 — from 1 to 2 weeks.
- Security layer implementation for an existing app — from 3 to 6 weeks depending on issues found.
- Full cycle "audit + implementation + test" — from 4 to 8 weeks.
Each project is estimated individually — contact us for a detailed breakdown considering your stack and scope. We work turnkey: from analysis to store deployment.
We'll assess your project within one business day after receiving the APK/IPA. Get in touch — we'll tell you which holes to close first. Schedule a consultation to discuss your mobile app security needs. Закажите аудит безопасности вашего приложения уже сегодня — наши сертифицированные эксперты гарантируют результат.