PIN Code Transaction Confirmation in Mobile Crypto Wallet

TRUETECH is engaged in the development, support and maintenance of iOS, Android, PWA mobile applications. We have extensive experience and expertise in publishing mobile applications in popular markets like Google Play, App Store, Amazon, AppGallery and others.
Development and support of all types of mobile applications:
Information and entertainment mobile applications
News apps, games, reference guides, online catalogs, weather apps, fitness and health apps, travel apps, educational apps, social networks and messengers, quizzes, blogs and podcasts, forums, aggregators
E-commerce mobile applications
Online stores, B2B apps, marketplaces, online exchanges, cashback services, exchanges, dropshipping platforms, loyalty programs, food and goods delivery, payment systems.
Business process management mobile applications
CRM systems, ERP systems, project management, sales team tools, financial management, production management, logistics and delivery management, HR management, data monitoring systems
Electronic services mobile applications
Classified ads platforms, online schools, online cinemas, electronic service platforms, cashback platforms, video hosting, thematic portals, online booking and scheduling platforms, online trading platforms

These are just some of the types of mobile applications we work with, and each of them may have its own specific features and functionality, tailored to the specific needs and goals of the client.

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PIN Code Transaction Confirmation in Mobile Crypto Wallet
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PIN Code Implementation for Transaction Confirmation in Mobile Crypto Wallet

PIN code — fallback to biometry and standalone transaction protection mechanism. Main implementation mistake: storing PIN in plaintext or comparing string representation without hashing. Second most common — not limiting attempts.

Storing PIN Correctly

PIN never stored as-is. Minimum acceptable: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with unique salt (32 bytes from CSPRNG) and iteration count from 100,000. Better — bcrypt or Argon2id, but latter requires third-party library on iOS.

On iOS: PBKDF2 via CCKeyDerivationPBKDF from CommonCrypto:

func deriveKey(from pin: String, salt: Data, iterations: UInt32 = 200_000) -> Data {
    var derivedKey = Data(count: 32)
    let pinData = pin.data(using: .utf8)!
    derivedKey.withUnsafeMutableBytes { derivedPtr in
        pinData.withUnsafeBytes { pinPtr in
            salt.withUnsafeBytes { saltPtr in
                CCKeyDerivationPBKDF(
                    CCPBKDFAlgorithm(kCCPBKDF2),
                    pinPtr.baseAddress, pinData.count,
                    saltPtr.baseAddress, salt.count,
                    CCPseudoRandomAlgorithm(kCCPRFHmacAlgSHA256),
                    iterations,
                    derivedPtr.baseAddress, 32
                )
            }
        }
    }
    return derivedKey
}

Salt + hash stored in Keychain with kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly. PIN from memory zeroed immediately after derivation.

Limiting Attempts and Lockout

After 3 failed attempts — delay (e.g., 30 seconds). After 5 — longer. After 10 — complete wallet lockout requiring seed phrase recovery. Attempt counter stored in Keychain (not UserDefaults — can be reset by deleting app data without root, Keychain cannot).

Attack via app delete and reinstall partially neutralized: iOS Keychain with kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly without kSecAttrSynchronizable survives reinstall. On Android, KeyStore data destroyed on app delete — store lockout via EncryptedSharedPreferences in separate contentProvider or via backend.

UI: Custom Numpad

System digit keyboard convenient, but makes visual control impossible — unclear how many digits entered. Custom numpad (6 circles + 10 digits + backspace) — standard for crypto wallets. Without haptic feedback on each tap — feels worse.

PIN field never should suggest autofill from iCloud Keychain or password manager — textContentType = .none + autocorrectionType = .no + keyboardType = .numberPad on hidden TextField under custom numpad.

Timeline — 1–3 days. PBKDF2 + UI numpad + attempt limiting — day-and-half. Adding anti-bypass mechanisms and edge case testing — up to three days.